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In recent years, there seems to be no
preference, choice, emotion, thought, or
behavior that has escaped the scrutiny
of a neuroimaging machine. Scanning
the brain allegedly reveals insights into
the foundations of morality (Greene
et al., 2001), altruism (Tankersley et al.,
2007), sense of humor (Bartolo et al.,
2006) and even religious beliefs and God
(Kapogiannis et al., 2009), to name just a
few of the disparate topics that have been
studied. As neuroimaging studies become
increasingly popular, a growing number
of researchers in the business disciplines
are applying such techniques within their
areas of interest. In such works, researchers
look at and map the parts of the brain that
are involved in processing decisions, pref-
erences, and choices. Studies range from
predicting future sales of popular songs
based on how certain areas in the brain
were activated on a sample of individuals
prior to a song’s release (Berns andMoore,
2012), how advertisements using various
forms of persuasion engage different parts
of the brain (Cook et al., 2011), and how
arbitrary prices of wine alter the reward
activities in an area of the brain associated
with pleasure (Plassmann et al., 2008).
The modus operandi of most imaging
procedures, such as fMRI, is to track blood
oxygenation in the brain with the under-
lying assumption that as blood flows to
a region, the more neurons are activated
in this area. The idea behind such stud-
ies is not only to locate the exact area in
the brain where information is processed,
but also to have insights into people’s true
thoughts and preferences, since individu-
als cannot control their brain activity and
are not always consciously aware of their
thought processes. There is a prevailing
view that by looking at individuals’ brain
activation patterns, we could unveil their
latent desires. Ariely and Berns (2010) dis-
cuss this premise skeptically, specifically
in the marketing discipline, where there
is a nagging fear that by looking at peo-
ple’s brains, marketers would be able to
predict individuals’ penchants for certain
products, future acquisitions and needs,
and hence manipulate customers to take
advantage of those desires.
This fear is probably unwarranted and
stems fromwhat Rozenblit and Keil (2002)
describe as “the illusion of explanatory
depth,” namely to exhibit overconfidence
in one’s ability to offer veridical expla-
nations about natural phenomena when
one’s true knowledge is tentative at best.
Neuroimaging scholars are especially sus-
ceptible to such biases. The striking
colorful brain photos and associated tech-
nical jargon have a persuasive effect on
researchers and lay person alike (McCabe
and Castel, 2008; Trout, 2008; Weisberg
et al., 2008), but this should not blind us to
some of the shortcomings of the paradigm
including the likelihood of reporting spu-
rious correlations (Vul et al., 2009) and
false positives such as the infamous case of
the neuronal activation patterns “found”
in a dead Atlantic salmon (Bennett et al.,
2010). Next we detail some of the problems
in neuroimaging research that need to be
taken into account, and offer a theoretical
framework that might be helpful in better
interpreting the reaped results.
There are several practical prob-
lems associated with the neuroimaging
paradigm. Imaging studies are typically
conducted in artificial settings where
subjects are physically constrained within
a narrow and claustrophobic device which
may lead to a selection bias. The contrived
laboratory environments lack ecological
validity and as such it is unclear whether
the neuronal activation patterns would
be the same were participants making
real and consequential choices. To make
an actual moral choice in real life dif-
fers from having to imagine making a
hypothetical one whilst lying down in a
machine. Brain scans are also quite costly
and thus sample sizes are typically quite
small, yielding low statistical power, a
possible overestimation of effects sizes,
or the failure to detect true effects when
they indeed exist (Button et al., 2013).
Underpowered studies are hard to replicate
and they often lead to selection biases in
published results. Such studies can either
report bogus results or can lead to the file
drawer effect (e.g., unpublished positive
results that did not reach significant levels
due to small samples). These problems
are relatively easy to fix with more rigor-
ous study designs that include adequate
sample sizes and transparency regarding
power calculations.
A more fundamental problem in neu-
roimaging studies is the inability to iden-
tify the exact area in the brain responsible
for a given cognitive process. The brain,
which consumes roughly 20% of all energy
in our body, is responsible for monitor-
ing and managing every human activity,
and is built in a complex network where
different modules work simultaneously for
almost any task (see Pinker, 1997). At
any moment, multiple areas are activated
concurrently, and it is not easy to pin-
point the one region that is responsible
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for a certain thought or desire, if one such
place even exists. Neuroimaging studies
are adept at illuminating areas in the brain
that are associated with certain behaviors,
thoughts, or preferences, but interpreting
which functions these areas serve based on
the images is difficult and typically can-
not be derived directly from such images.
Moreover, highlighted areas in the brain
do not exclude the possibility that other
parts of it are also involved, as these parts
may already be activated but not show
additional activity with the new task (Lee
et al., 2012). That said, recent studies have
documented the ability to classify mental
states, namely to accurately map a men-
tal task with a particular activation pattern
(Poldrack et al., 2009).
Locating a neuronal activation pattern
in the brain tells us little about the under-
lying causes that led to the cortical activ-
ity in question. To better understand the
causal mechanisms that lead individuals
to act the way they do, we need a meta-
theory one that has the power to explain
the ultimate causes of behaviors and pref-
erences and not just help “locate” them in
the brain. Evolution is the only scientific
theory that could explain the underlying
ultimate causes of behaviors and prefer-
ences, and the forces that shaped them
via natural and sexual selection processes.
The ultimate goal of every organism is to
survive and reproduce and thus, inquiries
into the functionality of the human brain
require the evolutionary lens. That said,
the great majority of neuroimaging studies
fall within the proximate realm (address
how and what factors), and as such they
seldom seek to elucidate the Darwinian
genesis of neuronal processes (ultimate
causation). It is one thing to detail where
in the brain emotions such as fear, love,
or anger “reside,” but another epistemo-
logical lens is needed to understand why
humans possess the ability to fear or
to love, under what circumstances these
emotions are activated, and which evo-
lutionary purpose they serve in terms
of an individual’s survival and reproduc-
tion outlooks. It is crucial to differentiate
between how cognitive processes mani-
fest themselves in the brain at the neural
level and the evolutionary pressures lead-
ing to the existence of such structures. The
identification of neural activities is impor-
tant and can shed some light on their
purpose, but without recognizing specific
evolutionary mechanisms such as natural,
sexual, and kin selection, we cannot fully
infer why they came to be in the first place
(see Senior et al., 2011).
A first step toward Darwinizing the
brain imaging paradigm would be to make
greater use of evolutionarily meaning-
ful stimuli and tasks (photos of a juicy
burger or a sexy prospective mate) instead
of largely relying on abstract domain-
general stimuli and tasks (playing chess or
choosing between probabilistic gambles).
Moreover, using an evolutionary frame-
work can help generate context-specific
stimuli that are differentially relevant to
various demographic groups. For exam-
ple, if we wish to examine how sexual
arousal is expressed in the brain, know-
ing the evolutionary roots of sexual fan-
tasies and how men and women differ
in their responses to visual stimuli (Ellis
and Symons, 1990) can help in devis-
ing experimental tasks that would pro-
duce sex-specific arousal (e.g., explicit
vs. non-explicit photos). More gener-
ally, evolutionary thinking can contribute
to neuroimaging research by invoking
domain-specific processes that map onto
key basal Darwinian modules including
survival, mating, kin selection, and reci-
procity (Platek et al., 2007; Saad, 2007,
2011).
The examination of the four Darwinian
modules has yielded new insights when
applied to neuroimaging research. In a
study pertaining to the survival mod-
ule, the mere exposure to pictures of
highly caloric food produced brain acti-
vation in areas associated with taste and
rewards, similar to ones that are trig-
gered in response to real food (Simmons
et al., 2005). Of relevance to the mat-
ing module, researchers found that when
faces of attractive women are presented
to men, these activate reward systems in
the brain that had previously been iden-
tified as responsible for other powerful
rewards such as drugs and money (Aharon
et al., 2001). Using kin selection principles,
Platek and Kemp (2009) showed how dif-
ferent parts of the medial substrates in the
brain are activated in response to faces of
kin, non-kin friends, and strangers. This
makes evolutionary sense since facial cat-
egorization and the ability to distinguish
between kin and non-kin have important
consequences for survival (differentiating
a friend from a foe) and reproduction
(avoiding incest with a family member).
More generally, the ability to recognize
human faces is itself adaptive. Using an
evolutionary perspective, researchers have
shown that the medial frontal cortex was
much more activated when making a deci-
sion about whether to trust another per-
son, but not when interacting with an
avatar (Riedl et al., 2014). Lastly, various
works have explored neural processes asso-
ciated with the reciprocity module includ-
ing identifying specific areas in the brain
that are activated during moral dilem-
mas that require cooperation (Singer et al.,
2004) and detecting cheaters (Stone et al.,
2002).
Ultimately, the exploration of evolved
domain-specific modules (rather than
domain-general cognitive processes) via
the use of ecologically relevant stimuli and
tasks will yield a consilient brain atlas.
Furthermore, it will likely reduce the “fish-
ing expedition for statistical significance”
feel of many neuroimaging studies, by
permitting for more ecologically relevant
study designs and by facilitating the posit-
ing of a priori hypotheses.
Given the apparent methodologi-
cal sophistication of the brain imaging
paradigm, neuroscientists are particularly
prone to what the Darwinian philoso-
pher Daniel Dennett referred to as “greedy
reductionism” (Dennett, 1995). Endless
studies are conducted void of any organiz-
ing theory or guiding a priori hypotheses.
Rather, the sophisticated methodology
drives the epistemological engine. In a sur-
vey of 50 neuroimaging studies only 42%
(21 papers) included a priori hypothe-
ses (Garcia and Saad, 2008). Of these, 15
were evolutionary based and 6 were non-
evolutionary based. Most striking is the
fact that only 17 of the 50 papers took an
evolutionary approach in the first place,
meaning that 88.2% of the evolution-
ary papers posited a priori hypotheses,
where only 18.2% of the non-evolutionary
papers used such hypotheses. In other
words, an evolutionary framework is
much more likely to generate a pri-
ori hypotheses that can be tested using
imaging devices, where non-evolutionary
approaches produce many more ad-hoc
and post-hoc explanations. Thus, a par-
simonious and integrative framework
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such as evolutionary theory serves as a
safeguard of the scientific method.
While some have described the neu-
roimaging paradigm as the new phrenol-
ogy (Uttal, 2001), we do not share such a
pessimistic outlook. Neuroscience is still a
nascent and rapidly developing field, and
some of the criticism is overstated (Farah,
2014). Recently, the United States and the
European Union announced two ambi-
tious projects: the BRAIN Initiative and
the Human Brain Project. Key objectives
include mapping the brain as well as creat-
ing a full simulation of it, which could not
only help us in better understanding the
human mind but also could help in com-
batting various brain and mental illnesses.
Similar to previously innovative technolo-
gies such as the telescope and the micro-
scope, brain imaging machines are merely
tools that need to be used within a specific
meta-theory. The evolutionary framework
could provide a good starting point as
an overarching theory to better organize
and fully understand the ultimate mecha-
nisms that drive our behaviors, emotions,
and thoughts, as seen in such lively brain
images.
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